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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Heath Clyne appeals, contending that the district court abused its discretion
when it denied his motion for leave to amend his petition for post conviction relief, and
wl1en it summarily dismissed his petition for relief.
In regard to the decision to summarily dismiss the petition, Mr. Clyne contends
that the evidence before the district court presented two genuine issues of material fact.
The first issue was that Mr. Clyne received ineffective assistance of counsel when his
defense counsel argued against Mr. Clyne's interests by arguing he was not a good
candidate

for

probation,

even

though

recommendation of probation from the State.

plea

agreement

provided

for

a

The second issue was that Mr. Clyne

received ineffective assistance of counsel when his defense counsel failed to seek or
secure a mental health evaluation that met the requirements of I.C. §§ 19-2522, -2523,
and/or -2524.
Mr. Clyne had moved for leave to amend his petition to clarify and add factual
support for those allegations.

In denying that motion, the district court abused its

discretion in two regards. First, it erroneously concluded that the claim regarding the
mental health evaluation had been raised in Mr. Clyne's direct appeal from the denial of
his motion for leniency pursuant to I.C.R. 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35 motion). Second, it
erroneously concluded that no amendment was necessary on the claim regarding trial
counsel arguing against Mr. Clyne's interests because that issue had been presented in
Mr. Clyne's pro se petition.

It made that decision despite the fact that it intended to
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summarily dismiss the petition based on the belief that it only presented bare and
conclusory allegations.
As a result of these errors, this Court should reverse the order denying
Mr. Clyne's motion for leave to amend his petition, vacate the judgment of dismissal,
and remand this case for further proceedings.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In the underlying criminal case, Mr. Clyne pied guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to one count of burglary. (Augmentation - Judgment of Conviction.) 1 The
plea agreement called for the State to recommend that the district court suspend
Mr. Clyne's sentence for a period of probation. (R., pp.64-66; see R., p.79.) The district
court ordered a mental health evaluation be performed on Mr. Clyne as part of the
presentence report (hereinafter, PSI). (Augmentation - Order for PSI.) However, at the
sentencing hearing, district court discussed the adequacy of the report generated in that
regard:

"having ordered a mental health evaluation, the Court's in a position where

essentially I don't have one. This evaluation is so terrible that it is the equivalent of
nothing." (R., p.83.) However, based on the representations of Mr. Clyne's attorney, it
did not order a new evaluation and proceeded with the sentencing hearing. (R., p.85.)
During that hearing, defense counsel uttered the recommendation from the plea
bargain, recommending that the district court commute Mr. Clyne's sentence or,
alternatively, suspend it for a two-year period of probation.

1

(R., p.85.)

However,

A motion requesting that this Court augment the record with, and take judicial notice
of, several documents of which the district court took judicial notice below has been filed
contemporaneously with this brief. Citations to any of those documents will identify the
documents as "Augmentation."
2

defense counsel effectively disavowed that recommendation by making several
assertions to the effect that Mr. Clyne was not a suitable candidate for probation.
(R., pp.84-85.) The district court ultimately imposed a unified sentence of five years,

with one year fixed, and it retained jurisdiction.
Conviction.)

(Augmentation - Judgment of

The district court subsequently relinquished jurisdiction and executed

Mr. Clyne's sentence. (Augmentation - Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction.) Thereafter,
Mr. Clyne filed a Rule 35 motion asking for a reduction of his sentence. (Augmentation
- Rule 35 Motion.) The district court denied that motion, noting that Mr. Clyne had not
presented any additional documentation in support of his motion.

(Augmentation -

Order Denying Rule 35 Motion.) Mr. Clyne filed a notice of appeal which was timely
only from the order denying his Rule 35 motion. (See Augmentation - Appellant's Brief,
pp.3-4.) The Court of Appeals affirmed the order denying the Rule 35 motion because
Mr. Clyne did not present new or additional information in support of his motion.
State v. Clyne, 2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 410 (Ct. App. Mar.11, 2014).
While that direct appeal was pending, Mr. Clyne filed a pro se petition for post
conviction relief, and the post conviction petition was timely from the judgment of
conviction. (R., pp.4-1 O; Augmentation - Judgment of Conviction.) He alleged that his
trial attorney was ineffective for several reasons, including having a conflict of interest,
failing to present evidence in mitigation at the sentencing hearing, and providing
insufficient argument at the sentencing hearing. (R., pp.5-6, 9-10.) He also moved for
the appointment of counsel. (R., pp.25-27.) The State denied those allegations, and
moved for an order summarily dismissing the petition. (R., pp.34-40.)

3

The district court decided to appoint counsel to represent Mr. Clyne. (R., p.42.)
The district court subsequently "gave Petitioner's counsel additional time to meet and
confer with Petitioner and, if warranted, file an amended petition."

(R., p.52.)

Thereafter, the district court entered a notice of intent to dismiss the petition, which
adopted the reasons articulated in the State's motion for summary dismissal as the
basis for the district court's decision. (R., p.61.)
On the same day the district court filed its notice of intent dismiss the petition,
Mr. Clyne, through post conviction counsel, filed a motion for leave to amend the
petition for post conviction relief.

(R., pp.63-66.) That motion included the proposed

amended petition, which would have revised the allegations to assert three claims for
relief: (1) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to properly investigate
the case and obtain mitigating evidence, specifically, a mental health evaluation which
conformed with I.C. §§ 19-2522, -2523, and/or -2524; (2) the district court deprived
Mr. Clyne of due process by failing to order said statutorily-adequate mental health
evaluation; and (3) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by arguing
against Mr. Clyne's interests at the sentencing hearing, specifically, by arguing against
Mr. Clyne's suitability for release on probation even though the plea agreement
provided that the State would recommend probation. (R., pp.64-66;

see R., p.79.) The

proposed amendment also alleged that, as a result of not having a statutorily-adequate
mental health evaluation, the district court "failed to consider" whether Mr. Clyne could
have been treated in the community for his mental health issues when it decided to
retain jurisdiction over Mr. Clyne instead of suspending his sentence. (R., p.65.)

4

However, despite its previous permission for
petition, the district court

the motion

the claims were not properly raised in the post conviction

conviction counsel to file an
it determined that
and that the third claim

already been presented in Mr. Clyne's prose motion. (R., pp.90-91.) In regard to
the claim about trial counsel's failure to obtain a mental health evaluation, the district
court determined that the same issue had been raised in Mr. Clyne's direct appeal. 2
(Tr., p.22, Ls.2-11.) As to the claim that the district court deprived Mr. Clyne of due
process, the district court determined that it should have been raised on direct appeal. 3
(Tr.,

1, L.21-

L.1.)

Finally, on the claim that trial counsel argued against

Mr. Clyne's interests at the sentencing hearing, the district court pointed out that the
claim had been presented to the district court in Mr. Clyne's pro se petition; therefore,
while the district court noted that it would consider the merits of that claim, it denied the
motion to amend. (Tr., p.21, Ls.6-20.)
Post conviction counsel subsequently filed an objection to summary dismissal
and a cross motion for summary disposition. (R., pp.97-105.) Post conviction counsel
discussed more facts which supported Mr. Clyne's claims for relief, and also argued that
the district court's decision to deny the motion to amend the petition was erroneous.
(R., pp.98-104.)

However, the district court concluded that post conviction counsel's

objection did not address the concerns in the notice of intent to dismiss (i.e., that the pro
se motion alleged insufficient facts to make out a claim for relief (R., pp.38-40, 61 )),

Mr. Clyne's direct appeal only challenged the decision to deny his Rule 35 motion.
~Augmentation -Appellant's Brief.)
Mr. Clyne does not challenge the district court's conclusion on the second contention,
conceding that, insofar as that claim could have been raised on direct appeal, it should
have been.
2

5

ruling on the motion

to

amend

summary judgment, and summarily dismissed Mr.
(R., pp.107-110.)
(R., pp:11

, denied

cross

petition for relief.

Mr. Clyne filed a notice of appeal timely from that judgment.

"14.)

6

ISSUES

1

2.

district
petition.

its discretion when it denied

r.

motion

Whether the district court erroneously summarily dismissed Mr. Clyne's petition
for post conviction relief in the face of at least one genuine issue of material fact.

7

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Clyne's Motion To Amend
His Petition
A.

Introduction
Mr. Clyne contends that the district court did not reach its decision to deny his

motion to amend regarding his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel through an
exercise of reason. The motion for leave to amend sought to add factual allegations
and clarify the claims being raised in the petition for relief. However, the district court
the amendment was not necessary because it erroneously determined that one
of the amended claims had been raised on direct appeal, and it determined that the
amendment to a second claim was

because it had been presented in the

prose petition (even though the district court had indicated it intended to dismiss the pro

se petition because it presented only bare, conclusory claims for relief).

Those

decisions constitute an abuse of the district court's discretion.
Post conviction proceedings are civil in nature, and therefore, are governed by
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (I.R.C.P.). McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 699700 (1999). In the relevant circumstance, those rules provide: "a party may amend a
pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave
shall be freely given when justice so requires." I.R.C.P. 15(a). As a result of this rule,
motions to amend pleadings "are to be liberally granted." Estate of Becker v. Callahan,
140 Idaho 522, 528 (2004) (emphasis added). "The purpose behind allowing a party to
amend its complaint is so that all claims will be decided on their merits and provide
notice of the claim and all facts at issue."

8

Iron Eagle Development, LLC v. Quality

Design Systems, Inc., 138 Idaho 487, 492 (2003).

It is preferable for claims to be

resolved "on the merits rather than on technicalities."

Carl f{ Christensen Family

Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 871 (1999).
Ultimately, the decision of whether to allow a party to amend its pleading is
addressed to the discretion of the district court. Estate of Becker, 140 Idaho at 528.
When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry. The sequence of the inquiry is (1) whether
the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether
the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and
consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and
(3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
State v. Hedger, 1 i 5 Idaho 598, 600 (1989) (internal quotation omitted). The district
court's decision to deny the motion to amend the petition in this case fails on the second
and third levels of the Hedger test. As such, that decision inconsistent with the rule to
liberally allow amendments to pleadings. Therefore, that decision constituted an abuse
of the district court's discretion.

B.

The District Court's Decision To Deny The Motion To Amend The Post
Conviction Petition Was Inconsistent With Precedent And Was Not Reached
Through An Exercise Of Reason
When petitioners file pro se petitions for post conviction relief, those "petitions

and affidavits filed by a pro se petitioner will often be conclusory and incomplete."
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792 (2004) (quoting Brown v. Sate, 135 Idaho
676, 679 (2001 ), superseded by statute on other grounds). In recognition, we appoint
counsel in and allow liberal amendment of the pleadings in those cases. In fact, the
only justification for summarily dismissing Mr. Clyne's petition was that Mr. Clyne's
petition was conclusory and incomplete:
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Petitioner provides no specifics as to what vvas argued, how counsel's
arguments were ineffective, or what could have been argued that would
have been more effective . . . other than making bare assertions or
allegations of ineffective assistance, he has provided nothing to allege or
show deficiency of performance. Additionally he has failed to show
prejudice .... In short, Petitioner has failed to meet his burden as he has
not shown a reasonable probability of a different outcome had different
arguments been made and therefore his claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel should be summarily dismissed without a hearing.
(R., pp.38-40; see also R., pp.61, 107-08 (the district court adopting the State's
argument as its justification for summary dismissal).)
The fact that the district court denied the motion to amend the petition is deeply
concerning because the amended petition sought to rectify those shortcomings in
Mr. Clyne's pro se petition. The proposed amended petition alleged specific facts that
clarified the claims for relief. (R., pp.64-66.) In that regard, post conviction counsel was
simply doing his job: "If [the petitioner] alleges facts to raise the possibility of a valid
claim, the district court should appoint counsel in order to give the petitioner an
opportunity with

counsel

to properly allege

the

necessary supporting facts."

Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793 (emphasis added).
As a result, the district court's decision effectively prevented Mr. Clyne from
responding to the stated justifications for summary dismissal.

That, in and of itself,

demonstrates the district court's abuse of discretion and justifies relief on appeal, since,
as the Idaho Supreme Court has held:

"A petitioner is entitled to notice of the trial

court's contemplated grounds for dismissal and an opportunity to respond before a
petition for post-conviction relief is dismissed.

Failure to provide such notice and

opportunity to be heard may result in the reversal of a summary dismissal of a petition
for post conviction relief." Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 676 (2010).

10

Furthermore, the reasons the district court

for

the motion to

petition were inconsistent with precedent and were not reasonable in light
justification for summarily dismissing the petition.

a result, the denial of the motion to

amend the petition constituted an abuse of the district court's discretion.

-1.

The District Court's Decision To Deny The Motion To Amend The Petition
Regarding The Claim That Trial Counsel Failed To Obtain A StatutorilyAdequate Mental Health Evaluation Was Inconsistent With Precedent And
Did Not Constitute An Exercise Of Reason, And So, Was An Abuse Of
Discretion

In regard to the claim that trial counsel failed to seek or secure a statutorilyadequate mental health evaluation, the district court denied the motion to amend
petition because the same issue "is being raised directly in the appeal from the Court's
decision denying the Rule

motion."

(Tr.,

Ls.5-7.)

being factually

wrong, that analysis ignored precedent that either expressly disallows for such claims to
be, or highly recommends that claim not be, addressed in the direct appeal. Therefore,
that decision was not within the district court's discretion.
First, the district court's assertion that the same issue was raised in the direct
appeal is factually wrong. In the Rule 35 appeal, Mr. Clyne simply argued that, based
on the evidence already in the record, particularly the information about Mr. Clyne's
mental health condition, the district court's decision to deny his Rule 35 motion
constituted an abuse of discretion. (Augmentation - Appellant's Brief.) As such, on
direct appeal, Mr. Clyne challenged the district court's decisions after the sentencing
hearing, whereas, in the post conviction case, Mr. Clyne challenged his attorney's
decisions prior to the sentencing hearing. Demonstrating this difference, in the direct
appeal, Mr. Clyne had to acknowledge that no new or additional information had been

11

presented in support of his Rule 35 motion, as required by the Idaho Supreme Court's
decision in State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).

Contrarily, in the post

conviction petition, Mr. Clyne claimed that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance
because he had not sought and presented mitigating evidence.

(R., pp.64-66.)

Therefore, while the post conviction argument may have been related to the argument
pursued on direct appeal, it certainly was not the same issue.
In fact, it would have been foolish, if not improper, for Mr. Clyne to have raised a
claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in his direct appeal from the Rule 35
motion.

Idaho's appellate courts have made it clear that claims for ineffective

assistance of counsel are not appropriately raised on direct appeal. Matthews v. State,
122 Idaho 80·1, 806 (1992) ("[A] petition for post-conviction relief is the preferred forum
for bringing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel"); State v. Saxton, 133 Idaho
546, 549 (Ct. App. 1999) (noting that "the trial record on direct appeal is rarely adequate
for review of [post conviction type] claims"). Idaho's appellate courts have also been
clear about the limited scope of Rule 35 motions. See State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82,
84-87 (2009) (discussing the scope of Rule 35 motions); State v. Housley, 119 Idaho
885, 889 (Ct. App. 1991) ("allegations, attacking the validity of [the] conviction, are
beyond the scope of a Rule 35 motion. Other remedies, such as ... a petition for post
conviction relief, are available" to make those claims).
As a result, the district court's conclusion - that the claim of ineffective
assistance included in the proposed amended petition had been raised in the direct
appeal - is not based on substantial or competent evidence, and should be disregarded
as clearly erroneous.

See, e.g., Lovitt v. Robideaux, 139 Idaho 322, 325 (2003).

12

the

justification for denying Mr. Clyne's motion
1 was inconsistent with the legal standards

in

to

decision and was not reached through an exercise of reason. As such, that decision
should

reversed.

2.

The District Court's Decision To Deny The Motion To Amend The Petition
Regarding The Claim That Trial Counsel Argued Against Mr. Clyne's
Interests Did Not Constitute An Exercise Of Reason, And So, Was An
Abuse Of Discretion

In regard to the claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance by arguing
against Mr. Clyne's interests at the sentencing hearing, the district court denied the
motion to amend the petition because it concluded that claim was already pending
before the district court based on Mr. Clyne's pro se petition.

(Tr., p.2·1, Ls.16-20.)

However, that is not a reason to deny a motion to amend the petition, especially where
the proposed amendment seeks to clarify the claim and provide additional factual
allegations in support of that claim. In fact, that is one of the services appointed counsel
is supposed to provide. See Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793. That is particularly true in
this case since the only justification offered for summarily dismissal was that the
allegations in the pro se petition were bare, conclusory allegations, which failed to
establish a genuine issue of material fact. (R., pp.38-40, 61.)
The proposed amendment alleged that counsel provided ineffective assistance
by "fail[ing] to properly interview petitioner and correctly present facts and arguments to
the court in mitigation of the crime." (R., p.66.) In support of that clarified claim for
relief, it offered the following factual allegations:
The Petitioner claims his attorney presented no evidence on his behalf
and advised the court at sentencing that the Petitioner was not a good

13

candidate for probation, contrary to the plea bargain for probation that his
attorney and the State of Idaho had negotiated. Without first obtaining a
proper psychological evaluation, the Petitioner's counsel effectively
argued against him at sentencing by failing to set forth any reasonable
plan for probation, with mental health treatment in the community.
(R., p.66.)

The initial petition and affidavit did not provide any such specific factual

allegations; Mr. Clyne had simply alleged that trial counsel "failed to argue and ad [sic]
rebuttal and allow for more testimony."

(See generally R., pp.4-9.)

Because those

additional allegations and clarifications were necessary to flesh out the claim so that it
met the requirements to survive summary dismissal, see Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984), even though the claim itself may have been at issue before the
district court, the amendment was necessary to continue pursuing that claim and
establish a genuine issue of material fact.
The paradox of the district court's decision is further evidenced by the fact that
the district court expressly told defense counsel at least three times that he would be
allowed to file an amended petition if he, trial counsel, determined that such action was
necessary. (Tr., p.7, Ls.12-17 ("I wanted to give you an opportunity to review that case
and potentially, if you deem that there are issue that warrant the filing of an
amended petition, allow you to do that.") (emphasis added); Tr., p.11, Ls.4-5 ("If you

deem warranted, file an amended petition.") (emphasis added); R., p.52 ("The Court
gave Petitioner's counsel additional time to meet with Petitioner, and if warranted, file

an amended petition.") (emphasis added).)

Defense counsel obviously determined

that an amended petition was necessary in this case, and so, filed a request to amend
the petition per the indications the district court had previously given him. And yet, upon

14

requesting to amend the petition as he deemed appropriate, and, in effect, replying to
the notice of intent to dismiss, the district court denied the motion.
That decision was not reached through an exercise of reason. It certainly does
not comport with the rule calling for liberally allowing parties to amend their pleadings,
so that claims may be resolved on their merits, rather than on technicalities (like
summary judgment for failing to articulate sufficient facts in support of the petition). See
Estate of Becker, 140 Idaho at 528; Iron Eagle Development, 138 Idaho at 492; Carl
H. Christensen Family Trust, 133 Idaho at 871. Therefore, the denial of Mr. Clyne's

motion to amend his petition constituted an abuse of the district court's discretion.

11.
The District Court Erroneously Summarily Dismissed Mr. Clyne's Petition For Post
Conviction Relief In The Face Of At Least One Genuine Issue Of Material Fact

A.

Introduction
Even if this Court determines that the district court properly denied the motion to

amend the petition, the district court still improperly summarily dismissed the petition.
Mr. Clyne presented a genuine issue of material fact that his trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance by failing to obtain a statutorily-adequate mental health
examination and by arguing against his interests at the sentencing hearing.

If either

claim were resolved in his favor, he would be entitled to relief. Therefore, the district
court's order summarily dismissing the petition should be reversed.
In post-conviction cases, a petition may be summarily dismissed only if it does
not present a genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in the petitioner's favor,
would entitle him to relief. Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153 (2008); see I.C. § 19-

15

4906(b).

In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, "[a] court is

required to accept the petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true .... "4 Baldwin, 145
Idaho at 153; Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 321 (1995). Additionally, during
the summary judgment phase, the courts "liberally construe the facts and reasonable
inferences in favor of the non-moving party." 5 Nevarez v. State, 145 Idaho 878, 881
(Ct. App.

2008); see also Charboneau v.

State,

140 Idaho 789,

792 (2004)

("[l]nferences [are] liberally construed in favor of the petitioner."). When a genuine issue
of material fact exists and would, if resolved in the petitioner's favor, entitle the petitioner
for relief, the district court must conduct an evidentiary hearing. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at
153; Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517,518 (1998).
To show a genuine issue of material fact in regard to a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, the petitioner must allege facts which demonstrate that counsel's
performance fell below a reasonable standard and that the petitioner was prejudiced by
that deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho
84 7, 850 (2004 ). In regard to the second prong of the Strickland test, a petitioner shows
prejudice when he demonstrates that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome
would have been different, or, in other words, he must undermine confidence in the
outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570 (2010).

4

Where, as in this case, the State files an answer that denies the allegations in the
verified petition (R., pp.30-33), those denials do not affirmatively disprove the
allegations. Rather, they only create genuine issues of material fact in regard to those
issues, specifically, whether or not the petitioner's allegations are factually accurate.
Because a genuine issue of material fact exists in such cases, summary dismissal is
inappropriate. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153.
5 In this case, the State is the moving party. (R., pp.34-40.) Therefore, the facts and
reasonable inferences are liberally construed in Mr. Clyne's favor. Charboneau, 140
Idaho at 792; Nevarez, 145 Idaho at 881.
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B

Mr. Clyne Presented A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact That His Trial Counsel
Provided Ineffective Performance By Arguing Against Mr. Clyne's Interests At
The Sentencing Hearing
The district court acknowledged that Mr. Clyne's claim - that his attorney argued

against his interests at the sentencing hearing

raised a viable claim, "[a]nd that is the

claim that I'm most concerned that it be heard and vetted, perhaps by way of an
evidentiary hearing, if appropriate." (Tr., p.21, Ls.6-15.) An attorney's performance is
objectively unreasonable if he actively argues against his client's interests. See, e.g.,

Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 278 n.10 (2000) (recognizing that "an indigent does, in
all cases, have the right have an attorney, zealous for the indigent's interests, evaluate
his case and

attempt to discern

nonfrivolous arguments" 6 )

(emphasis added);

Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 204 (1979) (holding that defense counsel's "principal
responsibility is to serve the undivided interests of his client").
The record supports Mr. Clyne's allegation that his counsel advocated against his
interests. 7 For example, the plea agreement Mr. Clyne entered provided as follows:

6

Mr. Clyne sought a sentence that was suspended for a period of probation. An
argument that suspending a sentence for a period of probation is not a frivolous
argument. See, e.g., See State v. Crockett, 146 Idaho 13, 14-15 (Ct. App. 2008)
(discussing how a sentence for a period of probation addresses all the sentencing
objectives and how the court's continuing jurisdiction affects those objectives). That is
especially true in this case, since, pursuant to the plea agreement, the prosecutor made
an argument that the district court should suspend Mr. Clyne's sentence. (R., p.83.)
7 Post conviction counsel offered clarification and explanation of the facts in the record
in the proposed amended petition. Counsel's explanations and clarifications of the facts
in the record should have been considered by the district court, and they further
demonstrate that there was a genuine issue of material fact in this case. In addition,
post conviction counsel represented that Mr. Clyne was prepared to sign the amended
petition, indicating that he proposed to have the amended petition verified. (Tr., p.13,
Ls.23-25.) In that case, the proposed amended petition would serve as evidence in its
own right. However, that did not happen because the district court denied the motion to
amend the petition. As such, if counsel's explanations and clarifications are not
properly considered because they were excluded from the record by the district court
17

The
to recommend a four-year period of probation with
five-year sentence, consisting of one plus four suspended. The remaining
charges will be dismissed. All other probation terms are basically open
argument.
agreed to pay restitution, but I don't actually think there's
any restitution in this case. I think everything was recovered, but if the
State has a figure of restitution related to either the charges he pleads
guilty to, the dismissed charges, we agree to pay that. And the remaining
charges will be dismissed. The defense can argue for less.
(R., p.79; see also Augmentation

Guilty Plea Advisory Form.)

The record also

demonstrates that, while trial counsel uttered a recommendation consistent with that
plea agreement (R., p.85), trial counsel effectively disavowed that recommendation by
arguing that Mr. Clyne was not a suitable candidate for probation: "But what we do see
his PSI is that in ways he's going to trip up are likely he's going to drink or he is
to have

related

mental health ....

looking

his history, it would

demonstrate that he's going to have trouble probably on probation and parole,
supervision . . . . He's probably not going to do probation right or parole right."
(R., pp.84-85.)

Therefore, the record demonstrates that counsel was not a zealous

advocate on Mr. Clyne's behalf, and as such, the record demonstrates that there is a
genuine issue of material fact that trial counsel's performance was objectively
unreasonable. 8
Mr. Clyne also alleged that, had counsel performed reasonably, he would have
presented the district court with a reasonable plan for probation, with a provision for

denying the motion to amend, that further demonstrates why the district court abused its
discretion in denying the motion for leave to amend the petition.
8 If this Court determines that the record affirmatively establishes that trial counsel did
advocate against his client, and so, affirmatively establishes that trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance, this Court should reverse the order denying Mr. Clyne's cross
motion for summary judgment, and order summary judgment be entered in Mr. Clyne's
favor on this claim.
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receiving mental health treatment in the community. (R., p.66.) That, in combination
with the fact that the State also recommend that the district court suspend sentence
(R., p.83), establishes the reasonable probability that the result (the decision to retain

jurisdiction) would have been different; certainly that evidence undermines confidence
that the district court would still have opted to retain jurisdiction, as opposed to
suspending the sentence.

See McKay, 148 Idaho at 570.

As such, Mr. Clyne's

allegations also establish a genuine issue of material fact that trial counsel's deficient
performance prejudiced him.
Furthermore, if that claim were resolved in Mr. Clyne's favor, he would be entitled
to relief. See, e.g., !Nood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 273-74 (1981) (vacating a judgment
because the defendant had sufficiently raised the specter of an actual conflict of interest
in representation at the trial level which would have deprived the defendant of his
constitutional rights, and remanding the case for further proceedings examining
the potential conflict). Therefore, Mr. Clyne was entitled to an evidentiary hearing, and
thus, the district court erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Clyne's petition for post
conviction relief.

C.

Mr. Clyne Presented A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact That His Trial Counsel
Provided Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Seek Or Secure A Mental Health
Evaluation That Conformed With The Statutory Requirements
Mr. Clyne's other claim - that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not

properly investigating the case and not presenting mitigating evidence at the sentencing
hearing, specifically, by failing to seek or secure a psychological evaluation conforming
with I.C. §§ 19-2522, -2523, and/or -2524 - also presented a genuine issue of material
fact. The requirement that the district courts obtain a mental health evaluation when a
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defendant's mental health will be a significant issue at sentencing is mandatory: "the
court shall appoint at least one (1) psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to examine and
report upon the mental condition of the defendant."9

I.C. § 19-2522(1) (emphasis

added).
In order to enforce this mandatory requirement, defense counsel needs to
request an evaluation be performed or object when the district court seeks to proceed
without one. State v. Carter, 155 Idaho 170, 173-75 (2013). The necessary corollary to
this rule is that, when defense counsel fails to ensure that a statutorily-adequate
evaluation is included in the record, counsel's performance has been objectively
unreasonable.
It is undisputed that no current, statutorily-adequate evaluation was provided
prior to sentencing. Furthermore, the district court asserted, "I need [a proper
evaluation] to sentence this defendant."

(R., p.83.)

With that statement alone, the

mandatory requirement from I.C. § 19-2522 for a proper evaluation should have been
given effect.

Compare State v. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817, 822-23 (Ct. App. 2010)

(holding that, when the district court indicates that defendant's mental health is going to
be a significant issue at sentencing, it needs an evaluation conforming with I.C. § 192522 before imposing sentence).

The prosecutor also recognized that "the prudent

course of action" would be to order a second evaluation, one that would conform with
the statutory requirements.

(R., p.83.) In fact, it was only Mr. Clyne's attorney who

9

In this case, a second evaluation was necessary because the district court found that
the evaluation originally provided was worthless: "having ordered a mental health
evaluation, the Court's in a position where essentially I don't have one. This evaluation
is so terrible that it is the equivalent of nothing." (R., p.83.)
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eschewed the need to procure a conforming evaluation, pointing instead to other, older
evaluations that had made diagnoses of Mr. Clyne in the past. (R., p.84.)
However, trial counsel's attempted reliance on the older evaluations is not
sufficient to meet the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522.

To make proper sentencing

determinations, diagnoses and prognoses need to be current, since the symptoms can
change, and as a result, the type of treatment necessary can change.

For example,

when a person suffers from multiple mental health disorders at the same time, 10 "the
severity of both disorders may change overtime. Levels of disability and impairment in
functioning may also vary."

Psychology Today, "Diagnosis Dictionary:

Co-Occuring

Disorders," (2008) http://www.psychologytoday.com/conditions/co-occurring-disorders
(last visited October 1, 2014 ). As such, the Court of Appeals has recognized that an old
evaluation, "[e]ven a psychological report prepared pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522 may be
insufficient," to provide the necessary information the district court must consider under
I.C. § 19-2523 at the new sentencing hearing. Durham, 146 Idaho at 370-71 (holding
such even though the district court did have documents from a mental health facility into
which the defendant had checked himself which provided a diagnosis of the defendant).
In fact, the district court's comment at the sentencing hearing - that "I need it [the
current mental health evaluation] to sentence this defendant (R., p.83) - which was
made after the district court received all the other information about Mr. Clyne's prior
evaluations contained in the PSI (see Tr., p.28, Ls.17-18 (the district court recalling that
"I had an enormous amount of material regarding the defendant's mental health"),

10

Mr. Clyne has been previously diagnosed with
schizophrenia. (See, e.g., R., p.84.)
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both

bipolar disorder and

demonstrates that the information the district court already had was insufficient to
adequately meet the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522.
Furthermore, as the amended petition pointed out, Mr. Clyne's actions in the
current case could potentially be attributed to particular diagnoses, and based on the
consideration of the facts of the current case, the district court could have considered
"whether the Petitioner could be treated for mental health concerns in the community
instead of in prison." (R., p.65.) Because the facts of the current case could impact
Mr. Clyne's diagnosis, both in terms of the nature of his mental condition and of
potential treatment options, and that more accurate diagnosis could impact the
sentencing decision, trial counsel's action - to affirmatively argue against the district
court following a mandatory requirement in the statute - was objectively unreasonable.
Compare State v. Durham, 146 Idaho 364, 368-69 (Ct. App. 2008) (remanding a case
for new sentencing with a statutorily-adequate evaluation, emphasizing the fact that the
new offense was out of character for the defendant and "factually irrational" as some of
the reasons the new evaluation was necessary).
As in Durham, the offense in this case was factually irrational. Mr. Clyne was
charged with taking a black Bible case, flashlights, and a pair of sunglasses from two
cars in an Albertson's parking lot in broad daylight. (Augmentation - Appellant's Brief,
p.2; Augmentation - Information.) As post conviction counsel pointed out, that behavior
could have been attributable to Mr. Clyne's mental conditions. (R., p.65.) Thus, as in

Durham, a new evaluation conforming to the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522 needed to
be conducted prior to sentencing; the older evaluations were not sufficient in that
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Durham, 1

Idaho at 367.

such, the district court

without the statutorily-required information.
Mr. Clyne also alleged facts establishing a genuine issue of material fact that trial
counsel's defective performance in this regard prejudiced him. Mr. Clyne alleged that,
had trial counsel performed reasonably and sought a statutorily-adequate evaluation, he
would have recommended a term of probation with an appropriate provision for
receiving adequate treatment in the community.

(R., pp.65-66.)

When that is

considered in combination with the fact that the State also recommended that the
district court suspend Mr. Clyne's sentence (R., p.83), the facts establish the reasonable
probability that the result (the decision to retain jurisdiction) would have been different.
Essentially, Mr. Clyne alleged that, had the district court had an up-to-date mental
health evaluation, which would have evaluated Mr. Clyne's current extent of his mental
illness, his current prognosis for improvement and rehabilitation, and the level of care
currently necessary to address his condition while protecting the public (as required by
I.C. § 19-2523), the district court would not have retained jurisdiction, but instead, would
have suspended his sentence.

Therefore, Mr. Clyne's allegations established a

genuine issue of material fact that trial counsel's deficient performance prejudiced him.
Furthermore, if the issue were resolved in Mr. Clyne's favor, he would be entitled
to relief. Compare Jockumsen, 148 Idaho at 822-23; Durham, 146 Idaho at 367. As a
result, Mr. Clyne was entitled to an evidentiary hearing, and thus, the district court erred
in summarily dismissing Mr. Clyne's petition.
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CONCLUSION
r. Clyne respectfully

that this Court reverse the order denying his

motion to amend his petition for post conviction relief,

the judgment summarily

dismissing his petition, and remand this case forfurther proceedings.
DATED this 8 th day of October, 2014.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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